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RUCKER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
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INTRODUCrION
Many of this nation's public housing projects are the sites of con-
centrated and persistent drug-related crime. While there are several
potential solutions to this problem,2 the United States Congress
adopted one particular approach when it passed the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 (the "Act")3-automatic eviction for drug activity, some-
times called the "one-strike" policy. 4 The Act imposes a strict liability
standard on public housing tenants who are directly or tangentially
involved in drug crimes5 and has been the impetus for federal regula-
tions that direct local Public Housing Authorities ("PHAs") to use
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I See generally Lisa Weil, Drug Related Evictions in Public Housing: Congress'Addiction to a Quick
Fix, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 161 (1991) (summarizing the state of criminal activity in public
housing).
2 Rather than addressing the problem after the drug crime has occurred, public housing
authorities could attack the root of the problem: poverty and violent crime. See, e.g., ALEX
KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1991) (describing life in Henry Homer Homes,
one of Chicago's most violent public housing projects). Public Housing Authorities could also
seek community participation for alternative drug elimination programs. See Robin S. Golden,
Toward a Model of Community Representation for Legal Assistance Lauyering: Examining the Role of
Legal Assistance Agencies in Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 527
(1998). See also Drug Policy Alliance, Reducing Harm: Treatment and Beyond, at
http://www.dpf.org/reducingharm (last visited Aug. 29, 2003) (stressing the importance of
treatment rather than punishment for drug users).
3 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 states: "The Congress finds that.., the Federal Gov-
ernment has a duty to provide public housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal
drugs... [and that] public housing projects in many areas suffer from rampant drug-related
crime." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5122, 102 Stat. 4181, 4301 (1988)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (2003)).
4 See, e.g., Robert Hornstein et al., One Strike for the Poor and How Many for the Rest of Us?,
LEGAL TIMES, March 18, 2002, at 66 (decrying the unfairness of the "one-strike" policy).
5 See Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781 CRB, 1998 U.S Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June
19, 1998).
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leases with one-strike provisions.6 Tenants who knowingly or unknow-
ingly violate these provisions are subject to immediate lease cancella-
tion and an unlawful detainer proceeding in municipal court if they
7do not leave the premises.
This strict-liability standard was challenged in HUD v. Rucker," and
in March 2002, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held that
Congress intended to give local public housing authorities the power
to evict tenants under the one-strike eviction policy, even if the ten-
ants were not aware that they were violating their leases.' The Court
also decided that this policy was constitutional."
Rucker was initiated by tenants of Oakland Housing Authority
("OHA") who were served with notices explaining that they had vio-
lated a provision of their leases and directing them to leave their
homes within three days.'2 The provision in question forbade drug-
related criminal activity by tenants, guests of tenants or anyone under
the tenants' control, on or near the public housing authority
grounds. OHA instituted the policy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1437d (1) (6), which directed all local housing authorities to adopt this
provision.
The statute does not provide a defense to tenants who were un-
aware of any drug-related criminal activity. While individual public
housing authorities have the discretion to adopt the "innocent ten-
ant" defense to counteract this problem,'4 others are free to reject it,
and do. Therefore, in all 3,400 local public housing authorities, ' 5 it is
possible for a tenant to be evicted despite a lack of individual wrong-
doing and without notice that she is in violation of her lease before it
is terminated.
By finding that innocent tenants are not entitled to defend them-
selves when they are charged with violating their leases, the Rucker
decision undermines the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
which was established to protect the rights of those who contract with
6 See id.
7 The district court in Rucker v. Davis mentions the fact that tenants are provided with hear-
ings after lease cancellation. See infra note 141.
8 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
9 The decision was 8-0, as Justice Breyer took no part. See id.
10 Id. at 136.
Id. at 135.
12 See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *5-7.
13 See id. at *3.
14 See infra text accompanying note 29.
15 There are approximately 1.2 million households living in public housing units. These
units are operated by over 3,400 local public housing authorities. See Rue Landau, Criminal Re-
cords and Subsidized Housing. Families Losing the Opportunity for Decent Shelter, in EVERY DOOR
CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 43, available at
http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
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the government to receive public benefits.' 6 Had the Court applied
an unconstitutional conditions analysis to Rucker, the statutory
scheme would most likely fail on due process grounds. Furthermore,
the decision continues the recent trend away from Goldberg v. Kelly7
in that it affirms the right/privilege distinction the Goldberg Court re-
jected. This trend amounts to an undervaluation of the property
rights of public assistance recipients, while recent Supreme Court tak-
ings decisions have done the opposite for private property owners."'
This comment addresses the constitutional issues at stake in
Rucker, a matter that was given little attention by the Supreme Court
in its written opinion. In Part I, I will explain the development of the
one-strike policy and the debate over the innocent tenant defense. I
will also describe the facts of the Rucker case, the lower courts' hold-
ings and the Supreme Court's decision. In Part II, I will lay out the
framework of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and scholars'
interpretations of its purposes. I will continue by exploring the place
of public housing and due process in an unconstitutional conditions
analysis, also focusing on scholars' and the Supreme Court's positions
on the rights of public assistance recipients. Part III details the ar-
guments against the Court's holding regarding the constitutional
questions in Rucker. The importance of Rucker in Supreme Court
doctrine remains to be seen, although it could signify an end to Gold-
bergera protections of the property rights of the poor.
I. THE "ONE-STRIKE" POLICY AND RUCKER
A. Congress Responds to Crime in Public Housing Units
In the late 1980's, the Reagan and Bush Administrations brought
the issue of drug crimes to the top of the national political agenda.' 9
Seeking to extend its "war on drugs" to public housing authorities,
Congress passed the Act.2° Congress then statutorily required public
housing agencies to use leases which provided that any criminal activ-
ity or drug-related criminal activity on or near 2 the public housing
16 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Con-
sent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988) (describing the history and current use of the doctrine).
17 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
18 I argue that the Court is in favor of limiting government interference with the property
rights of private (typically wealthier) property owners, which is demonstrated by takings cases,
but the Court is not as eager to defend the property rights of poor people. See infra discussion
accompanying note 134.
19 SeeWeil, supra note 1, at 163-64 (discussing drug activity in public housing projects).
20 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (2003).
21 In 1996, "on or near" was changed to "on or off' the premises. See 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(I)(5) (1997).
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premises may be cause for the termination of the tenancy.2 The De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") in turn
adopted these requirements as regulations in 1991.23 Local Public
Housing Authorities receive money from HUD and in exchange• , • 24
agree to abide by HUD's regulations. PHAs were thus required to
adopt the one-strike policy in their leases.2 5 Although the regulation
was adopted, most agencies rarely followed the policy. 26 This changed
when President Clinton signed an executive order in 1996 encourag-
ing public housing authorities to exercise the one-strike policv more
often and favoring authorities that did with increased funding. 
7
Congress did not instruct HUD whether to provide in its regula-
tions a defense for tenants who did not know about the drug-related
activity at issue.8 HUD considered this and decided not to include an
"innocent tenant" defense in its regulations. 9 Motivated by notions
of personal contractual responsibility,3° HUD broke from the com-
mon practice of including such a defense in forfeiture regulations.
In the civil forfeiture context-when the government seizes an indi-
vidual's property that has been used in a drug crime-Congress has
included an "innocent owner" defense in the governing statute.1
Furthermore, Congress has recognized a leasehold interest as a form
of property.32 Congress's intent as to the innocent tenant defense was
the issue in Rucker as it made its way through the courts. The Su-
preme Court decided that Congress did not intend to include an in-
nocent tenant defense in the Act.
34
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5) (1991). This is known as the "one-strike" policy. Congress
redesignated section 1437d(l)(5) as subsection (1)(6) in 1998, but the language was left un-
changed. I will continue to refer to this provision as (1) (5).
23 See Rucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000).
24 See id. at 631.
25 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f) (12) (i) (2003).
26 See AllPolitics, Clinton Cracks Down on Public Housing Crime (March 28, 1996), at
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/news/9603/28/housing/index.shtml.
27 See id.
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(I) (5) (1991).
See Rucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d at 633 ("Ultimately, however, HUD decided not to accept
[the] suggestions [of legal aid and tenant organizations], instead choosing to grant local PHAs
the discretion to evict a tenant whose household members or guests use or sell drugs on or near
the public housing premises regardless of whether the tenant knew or should have known of
such activity.").
30 See id.
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2003).
32 Congress amended the civil forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substances Act to in-
clude "any leasehold interest" as subject to civil forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (2003). See
also Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (discussing the meaning of
this amendment).
3 SeeHUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 126 (2002).
See id. The Court ruled on statutory interpretation grounds and gave little attention to the
constitutionality of the statute without an "innocent tenant" defense.
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B. The Rucker Case
In 1997 and 1998, Pearlie Rucker, Herman Walker, Willie Lee and
Barbara Hill, all residents of public housing units managed by the
OHA, received notices that instructed them to leave their homes
within three days.? The notices terminated the residents' tenancies
on the ground that they had violated paragraph 9(m) of their leases.
The paragraph provided that "[the tenant], any member of the
household, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not
engage in... [a]ny drug-related criminal activity on or near the
premises (e.g., manufacture, sale, distribution, use, or possession of
illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia, etc.) .
All four residents were unaware that they were in violation of the
lease provision 7 Rucker's son and daughter possessed cocaine sev-
eral blocks away from Rucker's apartment, Walker's in-home care-
giver kept cocaine in his apartment, and Lee's and Hill's grandsons
were in possession of marijuana in the parking lot of their housing
complex. All four residents acted within his or her power to comply
with the lease provision: Rucker searched her daughter's room for
illegal drugs regularly;39 Lee and Hill warned their household mem-
bers of the possibility of eviction for illegal drug activity;4° and Walker
was physically disabled and had little control over the actions of his
in-home caregiver, though he informed all guests of OHA's policy.
4'
After receiving the notices of termination, the residents brought
an action against HUD, the OHA and its director in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.42 They sought
injunctive relief against the unlawful detainer actions, claiming the
lease provision was administered against the intent of Congress, and
that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), state contract law, and federal
constitutional law.43
The plaintiffs claimed that the crux of the problem was that the
lease clause (and the provision of the Act that required it) imposed a
standard of strict liability on tenants without leaving them any de-
35 See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998).
3 See id. at *3-4.
37 See id. at *5-7.
38 See id.
39 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief at 3, Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 (N.D. Cal. June
19, 1998) (No. C-98-00781) [hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Memo"].
40 See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7.
41 See Plaintiffs' Memo at 8.
42 See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *1-2.
43 See id.
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fenses. 4 More specifically, plaintiffs who had no knowledge of illegal
drug activity were not entitled to claim that they were innocent.
There was no innocent tenant defense.
Plaintiffs' constitutional claims were that the lease provision vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.45 The provision violated due
process because of the practice of evicting tenants who had no
knowledge that their associates were engaging in the prohibited con-
duct. 46 Plaintiffs claimed that the First Amendment was violated be-
cause the lease allowed the state to interfere with their right to free-
dom of association. 47 The Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations
stemmed from the part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's provision that
allowed OHA officials to conduct warrantless searches of tenants'
homes and the provision that required tenants to report one another
to the authorities, respectively.
4
Plaintiffs relied on Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority to sup-
port their due process and First Amendment claims. In Tyson,
residents of various New York City public housing projects were
evicted on the grounds that they were "non-desirable."' Relatives of
the plaintiffs in Tyson (who did not live with them) were found engag-
ing in criminal activity without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. 52 The
District Court for the Southern District of New York indicated that
the housing authority regulation that authorized eviction for "non-
desirability" would "run afoul" of tenants' First Amendment right to
freedom of association. The court's analysis was based on the notion
that such punishment was based solely on tenants' relationships to
wrongdoers." Tyson articulated an eviction standard that had to be
followed in order to comply with due process: "[t]here must be some
causal nexus between the imposition of the sanction of eviction and
the plaintiffs' own conduct."54 Rucker plaintiffs argued that Tyson
stood for the proposition that an eviction for offensive behavior vio-
lated due process when the tenant could not reasonably foresee the
wrongful conduct of third parties."' The plaintiffs also relied on the
See Plaintiffs' Memo at 12-13.
45 See id. at 29-37.
46 See id. at 29-32.
47 See id. at 32-33.
48 See id. at 33-37.
49 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Flo See Plaintiffs' Memo at 29-32.
51 See Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 516-17.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 520.
5 Id. at 519.
55 See Plaintiffs' Memo at 29.
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Tyson holding to support their claim that such an eviction violated
the First Amendmen t.%
Although the Rucker plaintiffs argued that Tyson should rule, the
Rucker district court did not address plaintiffs' constitutional claims,
and in fact suggested that they might likely fail. However, the court
granted a preliminary injunction because it determined that the APA
claim would likely succeedY. Specifically, the court concluded that
Congress had not spoken on whether or not the Act required an in-
nocent tenant defense.5s Because Congress had not spoken, it was
conceivable that OHA's lease provision was in conflict with the au-
thorizing statute, thus violating the APA.5 9 As to the constitutional
claims, the court concluded that since the tenants could theoretically
do something to prevent the violation of the lease, they were not be-
ing punished for their association with the actual drug possessors.'
The defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, and the court held in their favor, vacating the in-
junction.61 After deciding that the lease provision and the Act were
properly interpreted to preclude an innocent tenant defense, the
court dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims including the First
Amendment claim and two new claims: (1) that the provision vio-
lated plaintiffs' substantive due process right to privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) that the provision violated plain-
tiffs' right to be free from excessive fines under the Eighth Amend-
ment.6-
After the decision, the court of appeals granted a rehearing en
banc, vacated the decision of the original panel, and reinstated the
63preliminary injunction. The panel reconsidered whether Congress
had intended to omit the innocent tenant defense from the Act and
held that it did not.64 Relying on the doctrine of constitutional avoid-
ance, the court determined that because the statute raised a substan-
56 See id.
57 See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *37-38.
58 Id. at *14.
59 Id. at *15-19.
6o Id. at *34-35 ("A tenant may control what occurs in her unit by ensuring that no one is
present when she is not and searching her apartment and perhaps, her guests and household
members before they enter. In other words, terminating the lease of a tenant for her failure to
maintain a drug-free environment in her apartment holds the tenant responsible for something
over which she has some control."). The hypothetical actions the court proposes that tenants
take would not have prevented any of the behavior that led to the eviction of the four plaintiffs.
All of them (except Walker, who the court concedes could not control the situation) were pun-
ished for drug activity that occurred outside the apartment.61
SeeRucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000).
62 See id. at 648.
63 SeeRuckerv. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
64 Id. at 1127.
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tial constitutional concern, it should be interpreted in favor of the
innocent tenant defense. 65 That constitutional concern was due
66process.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and over-
turned the en banc decision. The Court held that it was the intent
of Congress to omit the innocent tenant defense from the Act's one-
strike provision. 68 Furthermore, since the meaning of the provision
was unambiguous, it was unnecessary to invoke the doctrine of consti-
tutional avoidance.6 9 Eight Justices dismissed the due process claims
before them, first because the government was acting in its capacity as
a landlord and not a sovereign, 70 and second because the state court
eviction proceeding was sufficient to satisfy procedural due process.
However, the Court conceded that Greene v. Lindse 7 1 properly held
that tenants had a property right in their tenancy.72
The Supreme Court also dismissed plaintiffs' First and Eighth
Amendment claims, citing Lyng v. International Union. According to
the Court, "[Lyng] forecloses respondents claim that the eviction of
unknowing tenants violates the First Amendment guarantee of free-
dom of association ... [a] nd termination of tenancy 'is neither a cash
nor an in-kind payment imposed by and payable to the government'
and therefore is 'not subject to analysis as an excessive fine.'
74
In Lyng, union workers challenged section 109 of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 ("OBRA") because it excluded
striking workers from its food stamp program. 7 OBRA conditioned
the benefit of food stamps on refraining from striking. The plaintiffs
argued that this violated their right to freedom of association and
freedom of expression.76 Using a rational basis test, the Supreme
6" Id. at 1124 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994)).
Id. at 1124-25. The Court asserts that penalizing a person without any intentional wrong-
doing violates the due process clause and that tenants have a property interest in their tenancy.
"HUD's interpretation would permit tenants to be deprived of their property interest without
any relationship to individual wrongdoing." Id. at 1125.
67 See Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
68 Id. at 130.
69 Id. at 135.
70 The Court asserted that when the government is not acting in its capacity as sovereign, the
due process inquiry is entirely different. "The government is not attempting to criminally pun-
ish or civilly regulate respondents as members of the general populace. It is instead acting as a
landlord of property that it owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed
and which Congress has expressly required." See id.
7 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
72 The Court also asserted that the deprivation of this right-and the tenants' opportunity to
dispute the actual violation of the lease provision-would take place during the eviction hear-
ing and thus satisfy due process. See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135-36.
73 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
74 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 136 n.6 (quoting Rucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d at 648).
7' See Lyng, 485 U.S. 360 at 363.
76 See id. at 363-64.
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Court determined that the statute was constitutional." The facts of
the case did not demand a stricter analysis, the Court held, because
the statute did not violate any fundamental rights. 78 Further, the
Court distinguished withdrawing a government benefit from "physi-
cal and economic reprisals" and "civil liability., 79 In the case of with-
drawing a benefit, the Court concluded, the government's actions did
not pose as great a danger to the associational rights of the recipi-
ents.8° This is in line with the argument that the state's power to es-
tablish or eliminate a benefit (the food stamp program in this case)
includes the lesser power to impose conditions on the receipt of such
a benefit."'
Because the Rucker Court used Lyng to reject plaintiffs' First and
Eighth Amendment claims and because it asked questions at oral
arguments about the conditions imposed on tenants, 82 it seems as
though the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was not far from
the Justices' minds. Yet, the Court did not mention the doctrine, nor
did it give the extra protection to the plaintiffs' due process rights
that is required by the doctrine. This was not a trivial oversight, for
had they considered the case in light of the doctrine, it might have
come out the other way.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND THE
DEMISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR THE POOR
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions stands for the propo-
sition that the state cannot grant a privilege or a benefit on the con-
dition that the recipient must waive a constitutional right.3  Some
scholars, Kathleen Sullivan in particular, see the Court's new ap-
proach to substantive due process during the Lochner era as the be-
7 See id. at 370-73.
8 See id. at 370.
79 See id. at 367 n.5.
80 See id. at 366-67.
81 See infra note 99.
82 The transcript of the oral argument shows that some Justices had the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions in mind. See United States Supreme Court Oral Argument at 7, HUD v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (Nos. 00-1770 and 00-1781) (Feb. 19, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts.html) ("QUESTION
[by the Court]: Is it your position that the Government can place any terms and conditions
whatever on leases as long as it doesn't violate some other constitutional provision like the First
Amendment? ANSWER [by petitioner's counsel]: Yes, I think that is our position.
QUESTION: And so this is a condition that the Government has a right to impose. Is that your
basic position? ANSWER: That's right.").
83 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 6-7 ("[The] doctrine holds that even if a state has absolute
discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to condi-
tions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights.").
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84ginning of the doctrine. This theory categorizes the doctrine as an-
other check on government regulation. That said, it is not surprising
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine reemerged in the late
1960's to protect individual rights from government interference, as
did substantive due process."'
The Supreme Court has recently been growing more hesitant to
apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to individual rights
cases, 6 but it has not abandoned it altogether. Indeed, when the
constitutionality of forfeiture of property comes into question the
Rehnquist Court is almost always willing to invoke the doctrine. For
example, Justice Scalia used an unconstitutional conditions analysis
in Nollan v. Calfornia Coastal Commission.8 ' The Court held that the
government acted unconstitutionally when it refused to issue a build-
ing permit to the Nollans unless they agreed to grant an easement on
their property. 8  In his analysis, Justice Scalia introduced a new
"nexus" test for determining whether conditioning benefits was con-
stitutional. 9 Under the nexus test, the government must prove that
the permit conditions imposed on landowners further the same pur-
poses that would be furthered by a complete prohibition on build-
ing.0 This is a high burden for the government, reflecting the extra
protection Justice Scalia gave to property holders in the Nollans'
situation. The nexus test has been used in other takings cases. 9' Why
should the Court not, then, hold that conditions on public housing
leases require the same nexus test? Perhaps it is the Court's opinion
that the property interest public housing tenants have in their lease-
holds do not demand the same level of protection as the property in-
terest landowners have in their land. Such an opinion conforms with
traditional theories regarding the superiority of claims of right to
land over all other property rights. However, these theories are at
84 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1416 (1989)
("The Lochner Court first fashioned the doctrine.").
85 See id.
86 Lyng is the latest example of the erosion of the doctrine (in the First Amendment con-
text). See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
87 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
88 Id. at 84142.
89 See id. at 837.
90 See id. ("[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the de-
velopment ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out
plan of extortion.'").
91 See, e.g., Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district
court's application of the nexus tests in both Nollan and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994)); Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1275 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting that in due process takings claims the "plaintiff can allege that the regulation is arbi-
trary, irrational, and not substantially related to a legitimate governmental purpose."); Walz v.
Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 1995) (relying on Dolan's nexus test).
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best outdated, and at worst they blatantly favor wealthy individuals
over the poor.92
A. The Development of the Doctrine
Justice Scalia's nexus test is designed to protect individuals from
contracting away their constitutional rights, and it is one way of invok-
ing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The doctrine imposes
extra requirements on contracts between the government and indi-
viduals than ordinary contract law would impose. s Such contracts
may meet the requirements of contract law-offer, acceptance, con-
sideration, and consent-yet be invalid under the doctrine of uncon-• • 94
stitutional conditions . Justification for the extra protection de-
manded by the doctrine lies in the high value the Court has placed
on the individual liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights within the
last thirty-five years.9 Some have debated the appropriateness of in-
terfering with the right to contract away individual liberties. 96 How-
ever, the doctrine remains viable in modern constitutional law.97
The doctrine corrects an imbalance in bargaining power between
the government and individuals that can lead to the erosion of con-
stitutionally protected rights and individual autonomy. While indi-
92 For a discussion on re-conceiving property rights in the modern era, see Charles Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich classifies government largess as the new prop-
erty and advocates for protection of the rights associated with it.
93 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 8 ("Duress, force, misrepresentation, undue influence, and
incompetence may be used to set aside contracts that otherwise meet the normal requirements
of offer, acceptance, consideration, and consent. But none of these conventional grounds ac-
counts for the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which comes into play only after all
these conventional hurdles to consensual union have been overcome.").
94 See id.
95 The Warren Court revived the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the 1970's to
protect individual rights. With the re-emergence of the doctrine, the Court was able to shield
certain constitutional rights from the forces of a market economy. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices
of Rights: Towards a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185, 1188
(1990).
Justice Holmes and others disapprove of any interference into the government's ability to
contract. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 52 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he right to prohibit, regulate or tax foreign corporations in respect of business done
wholly within a State is not taken away by the fact that they also are engaged there in commerce
among the States."); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892) (hold-
ing that the city "may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its con-
trol"). On the other side, Professor Sullivan contends that the doctrine serves a crucial role in
that "[i]t identifies a characteristic technique by which government appears not to, but in fact
does burden [constitutional] liberties, triggering a demand for especially strong justification by
the state." Sullivan, supra, note 84, at 1419. Professor Epstein claims the doctrine is "a 'second
best' approach to controlling government discretion." Epstein, supra note 16, at 28. The best
approach, he says, would be to limit governmental power, but in the absence of that, the doc-
trine is useful as a "mop-up" solution when government's power is too broad. Id.
97 See Epstein, supra note 16, at 11 (describing several recent cases employing the doctrine).
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viduals who agree to waive their rights in return for a government
benefit can be said to exercise their own autonomy in certain situa-
tions, it is not true that the individual is acting autonomously when
she has little to no choice but to waive those rights.98 When the indi-
vidual must agree to the terms the government is offering in order to
obtain a benefit necessary for survival, the choice she makes is always
going to be to accept the terms and survive. The doctrine protects
individuals who make compromising choices because they can see no
alternatives.
For the purposes of the doctrine's application, it makes no differ-
ence whether the public benefit in question is a "right" or a "privi-
lege"-that is, whether the recipient is constitutionally entitled to the
benefit or the benefit is bestowed on the recipient because of gov-
ernment largess.99 Although some Justices have made a distinction
between the state's responsibility in both situations and refused to
protect individuals in cases where they were not constitutionally enti-
tled to the benefit they received,' 0 the Supreme Court has for the
most part avoided this distinction. To say that an individual is not en-
titled to constitutional protection simply because the benefit she re-
ceives is not guaranteed by the Constitution is to equate state benefits
with private benefits.' °' Certainly a private landlord can condition
tenancy on particular behavior, but the state is subject to different ob-
ligations. The Court developed the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions to hold the state to these obligations. Thus, the doctrine
prohibits the state from forcing individuals to contract away constitu-
tionally protected rights.
98 See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1383-84 (1984) ("A doctrine respecting individual choices.., requires
that such choices should at least result from conscious choice. Thus, in situations where no real
choice exists vis-d-vis the proffered incentive, one cannot claim comfort from discussion of
waiver.").
99 Often critics of giving extra protection to individuals in their contracts with the govern-
ment point to the argument that the government has no responsibility to protect constitutional
rights when the thing the individual is contracting for is a privilege and not a right. This
"greater includes the lesser" approach, although adopted by Justices like Holmes and
Rehnquist, is seen by many as flawed. See Kreimer, supra note 98, at 1311-12 (explaining that
this approach is misguided and inapplicable); William A. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1441 (1968) (positing that if the
right-privilege distinction were uniformly applied, it would have devastating effects on constitu-
tional claims in the public sector).
100 See Van Alstyne, supra note 99, at 1440.
'o See id. at 1460-61.
102 See id. ("[Tihe fourteenth amendment leaves private infringements unaffected, and it
does so whether such infringements are great or small, reasonable or arbitrary. That, after all,
was the lesson of the Civil Rights Cases in their literal rendering of the amendment: that it is
only a 'state' which is forbidden to ignore due process and equal protection in its dealings with
individuals.").
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B. Property Rights and Public Assistance Recipients: Applying the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to Public Housing Leases
Academic discourse about the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine usually arises when the government benefit is employment and
the right waived is the First Amendment right to freedom of speech
or freedom of religion. 10 3 In practice, however, the Supreme Court
has afforded extra protection to fundamental rights in cases involving
benefits other than employment and rights other than freedom of
speech.1 4 Further, if one were to accept Professor Sullivan's concep-
tion of the doctrine as comparable with a substantive due process
test,10 5 the right waived need not be specified in the Bill of Rights, but
instead can be a generally-accepted liberty, as freedom of contract
was in Lochner or the right to privacy was in Roe v. Wade0 6 and its
progeny.
A prospective tenant of a public housing authority that offers no
innocent tenant defense waives her right to a fair hearing (to proce-
dural due process) as a condition of receipt of the benefit. This vio-
lates unconstitutional conditions, and thus deprives tenants of the
substantive due process rights guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court's reluctance to apply the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to the one-strike policy demonstrates the erosion
of the doctrine's force in constitutional law'08 and a broader unwill-
ingness to protect the rights of the recipients of government aid.
A look at the history of public housing is useful to understand the
class of people affected by the one-strike policy. The U.S. govern-
ment began to provide public housing initially to workers who were
manufacturing war supplies during World War 0I9 With the onset of
10s See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 16, at 67 ("[U]nconstitutional conditions issues tend to be
raised with respect to restrictions relatively germane to the work at hand: the terms and condi-
tions of individual employment contracts.").
104 In addition to free speech, the Court has protected the right to be free from unconstitu-
tional takings in Nollan and Dolan, and due process rights in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Rail
Road Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), and Western Union Telephone Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1
(1910). The Fifth Circuit has protected the right to procedural due process in termination
from employment in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
The Sixth Circuit considered the right against self-incrimination in an unconstitutional condi-
tions analysis in Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 107 F.3d 1178 (6th Cir. 1997), and the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently indicated that the Contracts Clause
might provide a right that cannot be burdened by unconstitutional conditions. See Northwest-
ern Univ. v. City of Evanston, No. 00 C 7309, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17104 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11,
2002).
105 See supra text accompanying note 84.
106 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107 See Section II, for a discussion on the due process violations.
108 See Epstein, supra note 16 (discussing why Lyngis breaking with tradition).
109 See Peter Marcuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, in CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 253 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
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the Depression, it became necessary to increase the public housing
supply to accommodate the growing number of unemployed. The
Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 were instituted to begin slum clear-
ance in urban areas and to house the working poor. The Housing
Act of 1949 was so committed to this first goal that it spurred massive
demolition in urban areas, often under the direction of private de-
velopers and without the input of community members."' This led to
a shortage of housing because the program failed to rebuild after
clearing the slums."' Massive public housing projects were built to
accommodate the growing number of individuals in need of this
benefit. 1 3 Like welfare and other forms of public assistance, public
housing soon became critical to low-income families' survival.
Although public housing was underway long before the creation
of a comprehensive welfare program, the latter was able to inspire
more substantial and swifter victories for the fights of the poor than
the former. This had much to do with timing. The welfare rolls ex-
panded dramatically around the time of the Civil Rights Movement.'14
In 1960, 745,000 families received Aid for Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC"). By 1972, three million families were receiving
assistance from the program."11 At the same time, advocates for the
poor were gaining support from philosophers and the courts.16 In
1964, Charles Reich wrote The New Property,"7 an article which at-
tempted to dispense with traditional notions of property and recreate
them. Reich argued that growing government largess calls for recon-
sidering the rights of individuals who have a claim to some of that
largess and that "those forms of largess which are closely linked to
status must be deemed to be held as of right.""8 He also noted that
110 See id. at 254 (arguing that the Housing Acts were not acts of benevolence, but were rather
designed to ameliorate the physical conditions of inner cities and unemployment).
II See Georgette C. Poindexter, Who Gets the Final No? Tenant Participation in Public Housing
Redevelopment, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 659, 662 (2000) ("Charged with eliminating urban
blight, the 'federal bulldozer' of redevelopment efforts leveled entire neighborhoods across the
United States.").
112 See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 248 (1955) ("Under the public housing pro-
gram nearly 200,000 substandard dwelling units were eliminated by June 30, 1953; 77 per cent
was accomplished through demolition, 17 per cent through compulsory repair, and 6 per cent
by barring them to occupancy.").
113 See KOTLOWITZ, supra note 2, at 21-22 ("In the middle and late 1950s, publicly financed
high-rise complexes sprang up across the country like dandelions in a rainy spring... [In Chi-
cago, the complexes] were constructed on the edges of the city's black ghettos. Rather than
providing alternatives to what had become decrepit living conditions, public housing became
anchors for existing slums.").
114 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR
ON WELFARE 106 (1989).
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 Reich, supra note 92.
118 Id. at 785.
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the growing control of government over property and institutions
makes individuals more vulnerable to government Power and that
welfare recipients are some of the most vulnerable.11 This view was
embraced by many legal scholars and welfare rights activists. 2 ' Using
Reich's conception of property as both traditional property and gov-
ernment largess, they claimed that welfare recipients were entided to
all the constitutional protections afforded to private property own-
121
ers.
In 1968 to 1970, the Warren Court gave three major victories to
welfare rights activists. King v. Smith,12  Shapiro v. Thompson,1 2 3 and
Goldberg v. Kelly124 recognized the legal entitlements of welfare recipi-
ents to their benefits. In King, the Court ruled that families who
qualified for AFDC had a statutory right to receive the benefits and
therefore could not be denied them because of the sexual relation-
ships involving the head-of-household. 125 Shapiro held that a one-year
waiting period for new residents of a state to obtain welfare payments
violated the right to interstate travel. 126  Goldberg, which I discuss in
greater detail below, held that welfare recipients must receive a hear-
ing before their benefits are terminated in order to comply with pro-
cedural due process requirements.
27
These victories were short-lived, as the Court's membership
changed and public assistance again developed a stigma.'2 8 Conserva-
tive thinkers like Martin Anderson 129 and George Gilder 13 0 influenced
"9 Id. at 758.
120 See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlements and Welfare Benefits, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 262 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
121 See id. at 267 ("[L]egal scholars and social-welfare advocates"... [argued that] ... "if a
recipient satisfied the conditions of eligibility in the statute and regulations, he had a legally
enforceable right to receive the appropriate benefits .... A second version of the entitlement
argument was that since welfare benefits were a legal right defined by statute, they should not
be used by government to 'buy up' recipients' constitutional rights.").
122 SeeKingv. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 at 333-34 (1968).
123 SeeShapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 at 634, 641-42 (1969).
124 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 at 264 (1970).
125 See King, 392 U.S. 309.
126 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
127 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.
128 For a discussion of American society's perception of the poor, see KATZ, supra note 114, at
137-38 ("[A] war on welfare accompanied the conservative revival of the early 1980's..
. Increasingly worried about downward mobility and their children's future, many Americans
returned to an older psychology of scarcity. As they examined the sources of their distress,
looking for both villains and ways to cut public spending, ordinary Americans and their elected
representatives focused on welfare and its beneficiaries.").
129 See generally MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM
IN THE UNITED STATES (1978) (contending that poverty was almost completely eradicated from
the U.S. and proposing a scaled-back version of AFDC).
130 See generally GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981) (asserting that poverty is a
natural and beneficial byproduct of capitalism and welfare serves only to demoralize the poor).
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popular thought and the Court adopted their notions of entitlement.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and other members of the Court embraced
Justice Holmes's distinction between rights and privileges when de-
termining the appropriateness of constitutional protection.13' Deci-
sions like Arnett v. Kennedy, 32 which held that the government has the
power to deny due process protection because it has the power to
withdraw the benefit altogether,' eroded the progress made by the
Warren Court in earlier years. Thus, it is no surprise that the Rucker
plaintiffs held little hope of protection from government abuses of
power.
Perhaps the Rucker Court thought the one-strike policy was not
subject to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions not because of
the benefit involved nor the right waived, but rather because of those
affected by the policy-the poor. It is hard to imagine that the Court
would be as reluctant to find unconstitutional conditions in public
housing leases had the tenants been wealthy. For example, had Gov-
ernors or Presidents-both residents of a kind of public housing-
been subject to the policy, it would be doubtful that a court would
find their immediate eviction, without warning or opportunity to de-
fend themselves, constitutional.3 4 Further, recent takings decisions
indicate that private property owners are entitled to all the protec-• • •135
tions the Constitution allows. Still, the Court viewed public assis-
tance recipients less favorably.
Given that the Rucker circumstances call for the invocation of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the Supreme Court's refusal
to afford extra protection to the due process rights of public housing
tenants is symbolic of the Court's current social philosophy. Indeed,
the Court continued the tradition of cutting back on the rights of
public assistance recipients started in the mid-1970s, and, as I will dis-
cuss below, this tradition violates fundamental constitutional princi-
ples.
131 See Kreimer, supra note 98, at 1308-09.
132 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) ("[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably in-
tertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that
right, a litigant in the position of [the recipient of the benefit] must take the bitter with the
sweet.").
133 See id.
134 See Hornstein et al., supra note 4, at 66 (pointing out that the one-strike policy without the
innocent tenant defense only applies to poor residents of public housing, and not to elected
officials, notably GovernorJeb Bush and President George W. Bush); id. ("Rucker and the Bush
brothers are all residents of a species of public housing. All have a daughter who at one time or
another had legal problems with alcohol or drugs. But the consequences flowing from the
Bush daughter's problems are far different from those that Rucker has faced.").
135 See supra discussion accompanying note 87.
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III. THE RIGHTS THEYWA1VE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DUE PROCESS
ARGUMENTS SO SUMMARILY DISMISSED BY THE COURT
Public housing leases with the one-strike policy condition contin-
ued possession of a property interest (the tenancy)'36 on certain be-
havior. The behavior required is that the tenant, household mem-
ber, or anyone under the tenant's "control" (which to date has been
defined liberally so as to include people as independent as in-home
caregivers) 137 must refrain from engaging in criminal activity on or off
the premises. This condition fails to exempt tenants with no knowl-
edge of such activity from eviction and therefore force innocent ten-
ants to waive constitutional rights. First, this forces innocent tenants
to waive their right to procedural due process. Secondly, the Act
raises serious substantive due process concerns-concerns which the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine can address.' 8
A. Procedural Due Process: Do Innocent Tenants Really Get a Fair Hearing?
Leases enforced by § 1437d(1) (5)13 compel innocent tenants to
waive their right to procedural due process in order to qualify for
public housing. In Rucker, the Supreme Court found that state
unlawful detainer proceedings were enough to satisfy plaintiffs' rights
to procedural due process,4 0 but the Court failed to take into consid-
eration the timing of those proceedings. Unlawful detainer proceed-
ings are initiated after the leasehold has been cancelled, and there-
fore tenants do not receive the process guaranteed by the
Constitution until after they have been deprived of their property.141
The one-strike species of post-termination hearing does not comport
with the requirements demanded by Goldberg v. Kelly.
142
136 See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982) (noting that tenants were "deprived of
a significant interest in property[,] ... the right to continued residence in their homes").
See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *5-7 (explaining that Walker's in-home
caregpver was caught with cocaine and that Walker was physically disabled).
I believe the Act also forces public housing tenants to waive their rights to freedom of
association and to be free from excessive fines, but I will not analyze the Court's errors here. I
will focus on the due process rights waived, as the Court did not attempt to analyze their waiver
as unconstitutional conditions.
139 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l) (5) (1991). See supra note 22.
140 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 136.
141 The district court pointed out that the injury had occurred at the time tenants received
their notices, not at the state unlawful detainer proceedings. See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9345, at *9-10 ("The notice itself terminated each plaintiff's tenancy and ordered each
plaintiff to vacate the premises .... Plaintiffs were thus injured at the time OHA served each
with the notice. It was only because plaintiffs did not vacate as ordered to do so that OHA filed
the unlawful detainer actions. If plaintiffs had vacated, thus eliminating the need for an unlaw-
ful detainer action, they would... have suffered an injury-the loss of their apartments.").
142 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (noting that in the welfare context, "termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
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Goldberg held that due process requires an opportunity for notice
and a hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property inter-
est.143 The Goldberg plaintiffs (who were recipients of welfare benefits)
brought suit complaining that their benefits were terminated without
notice and a hearing.4 4 The Court held that this practice violated
due process and required that future hearings for welfare termina-
tion afford the individual "timely and adequate notice detailing the
reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to
defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his
own arguments and evidence orally."'45 Welfare benefits, the Court
concluded, required the pre-termination hearing detailed above be-
cause of the importance of welfare to survival and the "immediately
desperate" situation the individual would face if deprived of the
benefit erroneously. 46 The Court ruled that "[t]he extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced
by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,'
and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that
loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." 47
This reasoning was upheld in Mathews v. Eldridge14 a when the Court
outlined the factors that contribute to a judicial determination of
how much process should be awarded in administrative termination
procedures. Those factors were: (1) the importance of the benefit to
the individual; (2) the state's interest in limiting procedures; and (3)
the accuracy and fairness of procedures already in place.
49
The housing termination policy embodied in the one-strike stat-
ute does not meet the Goldberg or Mathews standards. Public housing
is as important to survival as welfare benefits. Without the opportu-
nity to live in government-subsidized housing, public housing tenants
would face homelessness. The government's interest in offering no
process for the withdrawal of this critical benefit is minimal. It might
argue that it has an interest in canceling the leases of tenants whose
associates are engaged in drug activity before a termination hearing
because of possible danger to society,ee but this is illogical. As the
which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes im-
mediately desperate.").143 See id.
144 See id. at 255.
145 Id. at 267-68.
146 Id. at 264.
147 Id. at 262-63 (citation omitted).
148 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (per curiam).
149 See id.
1A This justification is explored in the Supreme Court opinion. See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134
("Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who 'cannot control drug crime, or other criminal activi-
ties by a household member which threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to
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Rucker district court pointed out, the policy gives tenants greater in-
centives to not report drug crimes to the authorities.' 5' If an innocent
tenant were to find out that someone under her control was using
drugs, she would risk eviction by seeking help. If despite this in
consistency the policy were effective, one could go down the slippery
slope and advocate for evicting all current tenants because of the
crime and drug problems in public housing units. Why hold one in-
dividual accountable for drug activity outside of her control when the
whole public housing complex can be held responsible for drug activ-
ity outside its control? This logic is simply irrational. And the more
attenuated the connection between individual wrongdoing and pun-
ishment, the more due process rights are thwarted.
The proceedings in place for tenants who face eviction under the
policy do not come close to being extensive enough to promote accu-
racy and fairness. When tenants unknowingly violate the one-strike
provisions of their leases, they receive no warning other than a piece
of paper informing them that they have violated their leases and must
leave their apartments."3 In Pennsylvania, tenants evicted under this
policy are not entitled to the administrative grievance hearing that
other evictees are allowed. 154 They go through an expedited eviction
process and are not informed how to defend themselves from the
charges against them until after their leases have been cancelled and
the PHA sues them for unlawfully remaining in their units.
There is question over whether the Goldberg Court intended the
same procedural protections governing welfare termination to cover
public housing termination. Judging from the opinions of the fed-
eral courts and legislative history, it did. The Second,"5 Fourth,57
Fifth, Sixth, 55 Seventh,'6 and D.C. Courts of Appeals, as well as
other residents and the project.'" (quoting Public Housing and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed.
Reg. 51560, 51567 (Oct. 11, 1991) (codified as 24 C.F.R. pt. 966))).
151 See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *32.
152 See id. ("[T]erminating the leases of 'innocent' tenants may facilitate, or least conceal,
criminal drug-activity by ensuring that tenants who learn of such activity by their household
members or guests will not report the activity to the public housing or other authorities. If a
tenant were to report such conduct she would be advising the housing authority that she is in
breach of the lease and subject to termination of her tenancy since her guest or household
member engaged in drug-related criminal activity.").
153 See supra text accompanying note 35.
154 See Interview with Rue Landau, Community Legal Services attorney, in Philadelphia, Pa.
(Feb. 25, 2003).
155 See id.
156 SeeEscalerav. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
SeeCaulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970).
HIS eeGlover v. Hous. Auth., 444 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1971).
159 SeeThomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2002).
160 SeeJohnson v. Ill. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 467 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1972).
SeeStaubv.Johnson, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 162 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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district courts in the Third,162 Ninth ,16 and Eleventh64 Circuits, have
applied Goldbergs requirements to public housing termination hear-
ings. For example, in Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, the Fourth
Circuit analogized public housing tenants to welfare recipients be-
cause they both lacked power to recover from the termination of
benefits."'
When an innocent tenant receives notice that her lease has been
cancelled, she has been deprived of her property by the government
and receives a hearing in municipal court only after this deprivation.
The survival of most public housing tenants depends on their reten-
tion of their leaseholds, and therefore Goldberg and Mathews demand
that they receive adequate notice and the opportunity to defend
themselves at a fair hearing before their property rights are vio-
lated.' 66 The notice a tenant receives under the one-strike policy is
neither timely nor adequate. Furthermore, at the unlawful detainer
hearing an innocent tenant is not able to defend herself by present-
ing the obvious argument-that she was unaware of the conduct lead-
ing to the violation of her lease. Forcing public housing tenants to
agree to these procedures imposes unconstitutional conditions on
the receipt of government benefits.
B. Substantive Due Process: The Government-As-Landlord Argument and
Its Fallacies
Public housing tenants who enter into lease agreements that con-
tain the one-strike policy without an innocent tenant defense agree to
be deprived of their property interest whether or not they bear any
personal guilt. When the government punishes tenants for a wrong-
doing when they bear no responsibility, and when the government
subsequently denies them the opportunity to defend themselves, the
government is acting arbitrarily.'1 7 Denying tenants the procedural
162 See Staten v. Hous. Auth., 469 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (W.D.P.A. 1979).
163 SeeResslerv. Landrieu, 502 F. Supp. 324, 330 (D. Alaska 1980).
164 SeeKingv. Hous. Auth., 496 F. Supp. 800, 801-02 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
165 433 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1970) ("Not only is [the public housing tenant], by defini-
tion, one of a class who cannot afford acceptable housing so that he is 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss,' but should it be subsequently determined that his eviction was improper the
wrong cannot be speedily made right because of the demand for low-cost public housing and
the likelihood that the space from which he was evicted will be occupied by others.").
1 See Goldberg; 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
167 The en banc court of appeals held that there was a due process violation for this reason.
"[The statute] would permit tenants to be deprived of their property interest without any rela-
tionship to individual wrongdoing." Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d at 1125. "Penalizing conduct
that involves no intentional wrongdoing by an individual can run afoul of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 1124. The Supreme Court did not dismiss the logic of this argument, but rather
analyzed whether the two cases the appeals court used for support ruled. See Rucker, 535 U.S. at
135.
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protections to which they are constitutionally entitled violates sub-
stantive due process.168
The Supreme Court avoided the question of a substantive due
process violation by distinguishing the government's acts as a sover-
eign from those as a landlord. This analysis indicated that as a land-
lord, the government is not subject to constitutional review.' 69 Al-
though this illustrates the current thinking on the Court in regard to
the right/privilege distinction, as a conceptual matter it is somewhat
misleading. In the case of public housing, the government is acting
as a landlord only because that is how it has decided to disburse the
benefit in question-housing. The government could, and does in
the case of Section 8 vouchers, 70 disburse the benefit through con-
tractors who serve as landlords."' In that situation, the government
would be acting as sovereign in that it would be the funder, not the
operator, of the service provided. Just because the government has
decided to retain more intimate control over the disbursement of this
particular benefit does not necessarily mean it is an actor in the mar-
ket of low-income housing.
As the manager of public housing buildings, the government is
not acting like any other business. It has not limited itself to purely
institutional goals. 7 2 Rather, it manages housing units because it has
decided to provide citizens with shelter when they cannot afford it.
Moreover, managing public housing is not like managing a business,
for no private individual would enter into such a business because it
is not profitable. This is exemplified by the fact that there are virtu-
ally no other providers of low-income housing.
173
Perhaps the Supreme Court's landlord/sovereign distinction in
Rucker was meant to imply that when the government has the greater
16 In modern substantive due process cases, procedural rights and substantive rights are of-
ten conflated. See Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural
Due Process and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 848-49 (noting that procedural rights,
like the right to a trial byjury, are incorporated as substantive rights).
169 See supra note 70. The Court used this argument to assert that Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961) and Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915) did
not apply to Rucker. Interestingly, the Court did not rule on whether or not the statute actually
violated due process. However, in dismissing these two cases, it effectively struck down all of
plaintiffs' due process claims.
170 The Section 8 program, established by Housing Act of 1974, provides vouchers to quali-
fied low-income residents, which they can use to rent units from private developers.
1 In the Section 8 program, private landlords create their own leases.
172 See Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Cost of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment
in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1242 (1997) (positing that the Court allows limited
checks on governmental action when the government is acting as a business with specific insti-
tutional goals).
173 There are some private non-profit providers of affordable housing, but the majority of
public assistance recipients reside in housing controlled by local PHAs. The private affordable
housing options are normally too limited or too expensive.
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power to withdraw the benefit of public housing altogether, it has the
lesser power to condition the benefit however it sees fit. This is
equivalent to Holmes's logic in rejecting constitutional protections
on government privileges. f7 This approach certainly goes against
Goldberg, which eliminated this distinction for due process purposes,15
and may therefore indicate a retreat away from Goldberg. But accord-
ing to Van Alstyne, this approach confuses state action with private
action and can lead to overbroad police powers over individuals'
lives. 1
76
Assuming arguendo that the government is acting as sovereign in
the public housing context, and if it is subject to constitutional review
even as a landlord because of the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions, it is clear that innocent tenants are denied their right to sub-
stantive due process when they are evicted for violating the leases
drafted under § 1437d(1) (5). The one-strike policy without an inno-
cent tenant defense arbitrarily punishes unknowing public housing
tenants. This amounts to a capricious abuse of power, which is
barred by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. By forcing ten-
ants to waive their right to procedural due process and the liberties
protected by substantive due process, the government is imposing
unconstitutional conditions on their tenancies.
174 See supra note 96.
15 See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 791 (Peter L. Strauss et al. eds., 10th ed.
2003) ("Goldberg is universally understood as making a sharp break with the traditional analysis
by extending constitutional protection to a consummate 'privilege'-welfare.").
176 See Van Alstyne, supra note 99, at 1462 ("[Glovernment is playing an increasingly crucial
role in ... areas such as housing, education, and welfare. In the field of welfare especially, the
individual's alternatives to acceptance of arbitrary government action are practically nonexis-
tent, and the potential control over his personal life is therefore practically absolute. This sub-
stantial influence which expanded governmental activity gives the government over the private
lives of its citizenry makes the restraints of substantive due process necessary."). See also
Kreimer, supra note 98, at 1313 ("In reality, selective deprivation may be the less controlled and
hence the more dangerous power. In many situations, the government's absolute denial of a
benefit is not practically or politically feasible, absent overwhelming public necessity. It is only
this practical or political resistance that makes the government's possession of the greater
power at all tolerable. Allowing the government to deny benefits to some, but not all, of the
populace gives it a power that is nowhere implicit in the power to deny benefits absolutely.
Conversely, the selective denial of a benefit may be more onerous to a population accustomed
to the benefit than the failure to grant it in the first place.").
177 The Eighth Circuit recently found that the conditioning of a building permit on the crea-
tion of a dedication violated substantive due process because of the lack of connection to the
purposes behind granting building permits. The court held that "appellants stated a substan-
tive due process claim when they alleged that the City acted capriciously and arbitrarily and im-
posed an unconstitutional condition on the granting of the permit." Littlefield v. Afton, 785
F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 1986).
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CONCLUSION
The constitutional analysis in HUD v. Rucker is limited, but its sig-
nificance is great. The Court's decision not to address with any atten-
tion the due process issues that are glaringly present in Rucker should
be disturbing to all people concerned with the rights of the poor. It
may indicate many things, including a retreat from Goldberg and a
move back towards the right/privilege distinction, a growing defer-
ence to administrative agencies, or a more limited conception of the
property rights of the poor.
Fortunately the effects of Rucker on public housing residents may
not be immediately catastrophic. Local public housing authorities
still retain the discretion to adopt the innocent tenant defense. Such
local action will ameliorate the effects of the one-strike statute. Legis-
lation and litigation at the state level might also help. States like
Pennsylvania have codified the innocent tenant defense, 7 8 and state
constitutional actions might succeed where Rucker failed. States are
free to interpret their due process clauses more broadly than the
Court interpreted the federal due process clause.
Another chance for remedy might come through litigation sur-
rounding the part of the one-strike statute that governs the Section 8
program. It contains identical language as the public housing sec-
tion, and perhaps the lower courts will find that the innocent tenant
defense was meant to be included. This could force a newly-
comprised Court to reconsider Rucker in the future.
Writing for the majority in Goldberg, Justice Brennan laid out the
Court's thoughts on public assistance and the process its termination
demands:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the
dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to
recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to
their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions,
has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public
assistance system .... Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a
means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Lib-
erty to ourselves and our Posterity." The same governmental interests
that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted
provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hear-
ings are indispensable to that end.
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The poor are arguably the class most in need of protection from
government infringement on their individual rights, and over thirty
years ago, the Supreme Court recognized this and revived the doc-
178 See 35 P.S. § 780-157 (LEXIS through Act 8 of 2003 Legis. Sess.).
179 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65 (footnote omitted).
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trine of unconstitutional conditions. Rucker represents a move away
from the progress made by the Warren Court and a return to less
protection for public assistance recipients. It is now up to creative
civil rights lawyers and courts that value the rights of the most mar-
ginalized members of society to ensure that this trend is temporary
and anomalous.
